yielding results with greater predictive value: restricting the game to one-sided offers with one-sided uncertainty. When the uninformed party makes all the offers (the informed party only responding with "yes" or "no"), the complications of strategic communication largely disappear. One may have (unjustifiably and, we will show, incorrectly) conjectured from this literature that the multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes vanished as well. Sobel and Takahashi (1983) wrote the first paper to explore this approach. Their results mirror those obtained by Bulow (1982) and Stokey (1981) in the durable goods monopoly context. Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985) analyzed two distinct cases in the infinite-horizon game. In the case where the buyer's valuation is known discretely to exceed the seller's, they proved that the model generically has a unique sequential equilibrium and that there is a finite time by which all negotiations conclude. In the second (and, we think, more reasonable) case where there is no gap between the lowest buyer valuation and the seller's valuation, they demonstrated the existence of a backward induction equilibrium. All of the equilibria they constructed are weak-Markov and can be shown to satisfy the Coase conjecture.
The main result of our paper is a folk theorem for seller payoffs, for the "no gap" case. -As the time interval between successive periods approaches zero in durable goods monopoly (bargaining), the set of monopolist (seller) payoffs associated with subgame perfect (sequential) equilibria expands to the entire interval from zero to static monopoly profits.
We prove our Folk Theorem by constructing "reputational equilibria" consisting of a main price path and a punishment path. The main path starts with an arbitrary initial price and follows with an arbitrarily-slow (but positive) real-time rate of sales. The punishment path is taken from a weak-Markov equilibrium. As the time interval between periods approaches zero, adherence to the main path becomes subgame perfect, because (by the Coase conjecture) the punishment becomes increasingly severe. Continuously varying the initial price and the subsequent rate of sales yields all levels of profit.
Let us provide an interpretation of these equilibria. Initially, consumers believe they are facing a strong monopolist who will continue to adhere to the main price path specified in the equilibrium. However, the moment a deviation from the main price path occurs, consumers decide they are dealing with a weak monopolist who has read the Coase (1972) paper (and believes its message). The prospect of ruining her reputation thus deters the monopolist from ever deviating.
Observe that the vast multiplicity of equilibria in the current game is not due to the presence of incomplete information. "Reputation," in our equilibria, does not involve the seller's type5-buyers have no beliefs to be updated when off-equilibrium behavior is observed. Indeed, the durable goods monopoly model is a game of complete information. In the bargaining interpretation of the model, the only (observable) off-equilibrium buyer behavior which continues the game is 5One can also introduce reputation effects by adding buyer uncertainty about the monopolist's marginal cost. rejection of a nonpositive offer, and so there is little or no scope for the seller to make alternative inferences about the buyer's type. Hence, an equilibrium refinement which acts only to constrain off-equilibrium beliefs about type would have no effect on the set of equilibrium payoffs. Alternatively, one can limit the set of outcomes by restricting attention to weak-Markov equilibria. We do not find this restriction completely natural and, in any case, it is interesting to see what equilibria arise when the Markovian assumption is relaxed.
We extend and use two types of results (which seemingly endorse the Coase conjecture) to prove our folk theorem (which reverses the Coase conjecture). After describing the model (Section 2 ) and presenting a linear example (Section 3), we first demonstrate a general existence result on weak-Markov equilibria (Section 4). We then show that price paths associated with weak-Markov equilibria are uniformly low compared to the demand curve (Section 5). In Section 6, we proceed to establish the folk theorem for seller payoffs, under very general conditions. We conclude with Section 7.
THE MODEL
We consider a market for a good which is infinitely durable, and which is demanded only in quantity zero or one. There is a continuum of infinitely- Consumers seek to maximize their net surplus. The monopolist, meanwhile, faces a constant marginal cost of production, which we assume (without loss of generality) to equal zero. Her objective is to maximize the net present value of profits, using the same discount rate as consumers.
The monopolist offers the durable good for sale at discrete moments in time, spaced equally apart. The symbol z will denote the time interval between successive offers, and so sales occur at times t = 0, z, 2z,..., nz,.... We will sometimes refer to the "period" n rather than to the "time" t (= nz). Within each period, the timing of moves is as follows: first, the monopolist names a price; then, consumers who have not previously purchased decide whether or not to buy. After a time interval z elapses, play repeats.
A strategy for the monopolist specifies the price she will charge in each period, as a function of the history of prices charged in previous periods and the history of purchases by consumers. A strategy for a consumer specifies, in each period, whether or not to buy in that period, given the current price charged and the history of past prices and purchases. Formally, let G(z, r) denote the above game when the time interval between successive sales is z and payoffs are discounted at the rate r. Let a be a pure strategy for the monopolist. Then a is a sequence of functions {fn), a
The function an at date nz determines the monopolist's price in period n as a function of the prices she charged in previous periods and the actions chosen by consumers in the past. We impose measurability restrictions on joint consumer strategies below which imply that the set of consumer acceptances in period n, Q,, will be a measurable set, i.e.,Qn e S2, where Q2 is the Borel a-algebra on I. Then an: yn X n -y, with Y= [0, f(0)] and yn and Qn the n-fold Cartesian products of Y and Q2. A strategy combination for consumers is a sequence of functions {T }n)0 where Tn: yn+l X 2n X I -{0,1} is such that for each yn+l E yn+l and each BEn , Tn(yn+1, Bn, .) is measurable. Decision "O" is to be interpreted as a decision not to buy in the current period; decision "1" indicates that a sale takes place in the current period. Obviously, we require that Tn(y+'1, B, q) = 0 for all q E U-0QJ.6
Let 2 be the pure strategy space for the monopolist, and T be the set of pure strategy combinations for consumers. The strategy profile { a, ), with = { T( }) 0, generates a path of prices and sales which can be computed recursively.
The pattern of prices and sales over time in turn determines the payoffs to the players. Let 7r(a, r) be the net present value of profits generated by the strategy profile {a, T}, and let uq(a, T) be the discounted net surplus derived by consumer q. The profile { a, } is a Nash equilibrium if and only if In general, a buyer's accept/reject decision may depend not only on the current price, p, but also on the history, Hn. We define a weak-Markov equilibrium to be a subgame perfect equilibrium in which (after histories that contain no simultaneous buyer deviations of positive measure; see footnote 9, below) the accept/reject decisions of all (remaining) buyers depend only on the current price. The set of all weak-Markov equilibria is denoted by the symbol Ew(f, z).
The buyer's strategy in a weak-Markov equilibrium can be described by an acceptance function P(-), where consumer q accepts a price p if and only if p < P(q). When f (.) is strictly monotone, Lemma 2.1 implies that P(.) is nonincreasing. When f (.) has flat sections, P(.) may be nonmonotone. However, any consumers who violate monotonicity for P(.) have identical valuations, so by permuting them, we may (without loss of generality) assume that P(-) is monotone. Since deviations by sets of measure zero of consumers do not affect the equilibrium, we further assume (still without loss of generality) that P(-) is a left-continuous, nonincreasing function. Thus (after histories that contain no buyer deviations), the set of remaining buyers is an interval (q, 1], where O<q<1.
For a given weak-Markov equilibrium, consider the net present value of profits to the monopolist after any history for which the set of remaining buyers (except for sets of measure zero) equals (q, 1]. Since buyer acceptances depend only on the prices which the monopolist will henceforth charge, this value is a function R(.) of q only, and must satisfy the dynamic programming equation: time. This is because only nonpositive prices can clear the market entirely and because it is suboptimal for the monopolist to ever charge a nonpositive price (since P(y) > 0 for y e [0,1)).
Let T(q) be the argmax correspondence in (2.1) and let t(q) = inf { T(q)}.
Then the monopolist's equilibrium action when customers (q, 1] remain is always to charge a price of P(y), for some y E T(q). Since T(-) is monotone, it is single-valued except at possibly a countable set of q. Excluding this set, the monopolist's action depends only on the summary statistic q, and in fact is to charge the price S(q) P(t(q)). Meanwhile, suppose that the set of remaining customers was brought to (q, 1] by an offer of P(q), where q has the property that T(q) is single-valued. Buyer optimization requires that consumer q was indifferent between the price P(q) and the deferred offer S(q). Consequently:
When T(q) is multiple-valued, the monopolist may now mix among prices in the set P(T(q)) P(y): y E T(q)}. A variant of (2.2) still holds, where S(q) is replaced by an element of the convex hull of P(T(q)) which has the interpretation of expected price. If p-1 was the price charged in the previous period, the monopolist should now play a (possibly) mixed strategy such that the expected price, p, satisfies:
Such a mixed strategy justifies the decision of q to purchase in the previous period and of all q' E (q, 1] to reject. Proposition 4.3 will demonstrate that randomization cannot occur along the equilibrium path except, possibly, in the initial period. Equation (2.2) and inequality (2.3) establish that it is sufficient for a monopolist, in optimizing against consumers who use an acceptance function P(q), to utilize a strategy which only depends on q and the previous price P-1i It is convenient to restrict attention to equilibria which have this property. We will henceforth consider this restriction part of the definition of weak-Markov equilibrium. Note, via Proposition 4.3, that requiring the monopolist to condition only on q and p-does not affect the players' equilibrium payoffs attainable in weak-Markov equilibria.
Perhaps a more natural Markovian restriction would be to limit the monopolist to condition her strategy on the payoff-relevant part of the history, namely q, only. Unfortunately, such equilibria (termed strong-Markov equilibria) do not, in general, exist (see Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985) ). In fact, if (P, R) is associated with a weak-Markov equilibrium and P(-) is discontinuous, it is possible to show that randomization is (generically) necessary whenever Pi lies in a discontinuity of the range of P(-).
One final remark: for expositional ease, all of our subsequent definitions, theorems and proofs will be phrased in the language of durable goods monopoly.
However, all of our results also hold for the bargaining game, provided one substitutes "sequential equilibrium" whenever the phrase "subgame perfect equilibrium" appears. It should then be understood that if F(v) denotes the (commonly known) distribution function of buyer valuations, F(v)= 1 -y, where y = inf { q: f(q) = v }. Furthermore, qn then corresponds to the seller's point of truncation, after history Hn, of her prior distribution on the buyer's valuation.
A LINEAR EXAMPLE
Consider a linear demand example with unit slope and unit intercept, i.e., f(q) = 1-q. Let z be the time interval between periods. For this case, Stokey (1981) and Sobel and Takahashi (1983) proved the existence of a strong-Markov equilibrium in which the monopolist charges a price equalling az(l -q) after any history in which all consumers (q, 1] remain, and earns a corresponding profit of R(q) = (a/2)(1 -q)2. These authors also showed that limz 0az=0, thereby confirming the Coase conjecture.
We will now indicate how to construct reputational equilibria which yield the monopolist, for sufficiently small z, essentially any payoff between zero and static monopoly profits. Consider a strategy in which the monopolist follows an exponentially descending price path p(t) =poe-t (confined to the grid of times (0, z, 2z,... }), as long as no deviation from this rule has occurred in the past, and reverts to the strong-Markov equilibrium described above, otherwise. Consumers adopt strategies which are optimal given this behavior.
Fix the real-time rate of descent q > 0 to be sufficiently slow that, independently of z, the sales in the initial period are bounded away from zero. For any time interval z > 0, let the (equilibrium path) price in period n be Pn p(nz). Then, by consumer indifference, the set of consumers remaining after period n equals (qnl, . Since demand is linear, this establishes that sales exponentially descend at the same rate 71, and that the price and sales in every period are constant multiples of (1 -qn). Consequently, along the equilibrium path, the continuation profits evaluated in any period n > 1 are a constant multiple, XZ, of (1 -qn)2. Observe that as the interval z approaches zero, consumers purchase at arbitrarily close to the times that they would against a continuous-time price path poe-'. Thus, --> X > 0, where X is the constant derived from a profit calculation along a continuous time path.
In every period, the monopolist must weigh continuation profits against the payoff from optimally deviating. Any deviation causes the consumers to instantly adopt the acceptance function from the strong-Markov equilibrium. Hence, the optimal derivation when customers (qn, 1] remain yields profits of exactly R(qn) = (az/2)(1 -qn)2. Observe that there exists z1 > 0 such that whenever the time interval satisfies 0 < z < zl, we have az/2 < Xz, deterring deviations from the continuation path in all periods n > 1. Meanwhile, let ro(,, z) denote the seller's equilibrium profits evaluated in period zero. Since limZ,0o(, z) >0, there exists Z2 (0 < Z2 < Z1) such that whenever the time interval satisfies 0 < Z < Z2, we have az/2 <0Q(,q, z), deterring deviations in period zero as well.
Finally, note that limz 1 ogo(, z) = po(l -po) and that static monopoly profits equal 1/4. We conclude that by continuously varying the initial price po and the rate of descent n, and by making z sufficiently small, every level of profits in (0,1/4) can be sustained.
EXISTENCE OF WEAK-MARKOV EQUILIBRIA
In order to extend the reasoning of the previous section to general demand curves, we need to demonstrate two facts which were demonstrated by formula for the linear case. We lay this groundwork here and in the next section. First, we show the existence of weak-Markov equilibria for general demand curves (see also Appendix A). This gives us well-defined secondary paths, reverted to in case of deviation from the proposed equilibrium path. Then, in Section 5, we demonstrate that these secondary paths become uniformly low (compared to the highest valuation remaining) as z approaches zero, enabling them to be effective deterrents.
We begin by defining general demand curves. 
THE UNIFORM COASE CONJECTURE
In this section, we strengthen the "Coase conjecture" by presenting a theorem that guarantees uniformly low prices for all weak-Markov equilibria of families of demand curves.
While the uniform Coase conjecture is of independent interest, we require it here as an intermediate step for use in the main result of the paper: the folk theorem of Section 6. It should be observed that there is a straightforward reason why we did not need to examine families of demand curves to treat the linear case in Section 3: given linear demand, every derived residual demand curve is linear as well.10 For generic demand curves, however, the residual demand curves are no longer rescaled versions of the original one. Thus, considerations of subgame perfection lead us naturally to study families of demand curves. We will demonstrate, for all residual demand curves arising from a demand curve f, that all price paths derived from weak-Markov equilibria are uniformly low compared to the highest remaining consumer valuation. This establishes that weak-Markov price paths may be used to deter deviation from the main price paths of reputational equilibria.
Define The only significant restriction implicit in the definition of ,L M, a is that f(1) = 0. Otherwise, the family is very general. It allows, for example, differentiable demand curves with derivatives bounded above and bounded away from zero, demand curves which are not Lipschitz-continuous at 1, and demand curves which are severely discontinuous.
Let us also define a rescaled residual demand curve as a normalized version of the demand that remains after any proportion of customers have purchased: 
THE FOLK THEOREM FOR SELLER PAYOFFS
In this section, we prove Theorem 6.4, the main result of the paper. First, let SE(f, r, z) denote, for the durable goods monopoly model, the set of all monopolist payoffs arising from subgame perfect equilibria when the demand curve is f, the interest rate is r, and the time interval between periods is z. For the bargaining game with one-sided incomplete information, the same expression denotes the set of all seller payoffs arising from sequential equilibria. Theorem 6.4 will establish that SE(f, r, z) expands to the entire interval from zero to static monopoly profits, as the time interval z approaches zero. Its proof utilizes the fact that f E L, M,a has the uniform Coase property, which we now define: We will further call (p, q',) a reputational equilibrium if this reputational price strategy, in conjunction with optimal consumer behavior, forms a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Observe that the definition of reputational equilibrium requires that strategy a, by itself, be associated with a subgame perfect equilibrium. A reputational equilibrium is defined analogously for the bargaining game; note that "q" is then omitted. We can now state and prove the main result. Hence, using (6.10), 7r(q, z) < r(ql, z) + Iq -qll. Define r(ql, z) = sup { r(q, z): 0 < q < ql}. Observe that X is monotone nondecreasing in ql and also satisfies (q', z) < f(ql, z) + Iq -qll. Thus, X is continuous in ql, for any z> 0. Let r* = supof (q) and choose q* so that qr* = q*f(q*). Given e (0 < e < 7r*), define X = [7r* -£]/7r*. By Claim 2, there exists z6 > 0 such that there exists a reputational equilibrium with profits at least XTr* = r* -e whenever 0 < z < z. Also, using (6.10), observe that limoz r(0, z) = 0, and so there exists z7 > 0 such that 7r(0, z) < e whenever 0 < z < z7. Finally, by Claim 1, there exists 8 > 0 such that (pq, ', ) defined from q = 0 is a reputational equilibrium whenever 0 < z < Z. Define z = min {, z, z, Z }. Then for any z satisfying 0 < z < z, 7r(0, z) < e and r(v/Xq*, z) > I* -e. Furthermore, we have already shown that 7rT > rz for 0 < z < z and n > 1, so (ip, ', ao) is a reputational equilibrium for all q1 that yield %o > rT(0, z). Finally, since 7(ql, z) is continuous in ql, the set { T(ql, z): 0 < ql < /X-q* and 7r(ql, z) > r(0, z)} is an interval. Since e and r* -e are both contained in that interval, we have established (6.3).
Q.E.D.
CONCLUSION
Consider the outcome of durable goods monopoly (or bargaining) when the time interval between successive periods approaches infinity. In this situation, the monopolist (seller) has close to unlimited commitment power, and thus her maximum equilibrium payoff approaches static monopoly profits. Meanwhile, as we demonstrated in the Folk Theorem, the same outcome is attainable in the limit as the time interval between periods approaches zero. We conclude that the "maximum possible seller surplus" is minimized at some intermediate time interval-let us call this the time interval of least commitment.
We explain this phenomenon as the result of two countervailing forces. When the time interval between periods is short, reputational effects may be devastatingly effective in preserving monopoly power. When the time interval between periods is long, reputational effects are superfluous. The most adverse circumstance for the monopolist may be when the time interval is just long enough to 525 preclude reputational equilibria (but still sufficiently short that the inability to commit is a problem).
Let us also explain the somewhat unexpected discontinuity in the equilibrium set, based on whether or not there is separation between seller and buyer valuations. Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985) demonstrated that in the case of a "gap" between seller and buyer valuations (and subject to some regularity conditions) there is a uniform finite bound to the number of periods in which sales can occur in any subgame perfect equilibrium. Backward induction then forces subgame perfect equilibria to be Markovian, and the Coase conjecture drives the initial price near the lowest buyer valuation. However, in the case of "no gap" treated here, sales necessarily occur over infinite time. There is no last period from which to apply backward induction, and reputation supports equilibria which approximate static monopoly pricing.
We can also draw an interesting comparison between the present monopoly model and the analogous oligopoly model (Ausubel and Deneckere (1987) and Gul (1987) ). Folk theorems for joint profits hold in the durable goods oligopoly, even when there is a "gap," because oligopolists can extend sales over infinite time. This defeats monopoly results driven by backward induction. Moreover, the oligopolists' joint profits may exceed the monopolist's theoretical maximum (when the time interval between periods is short), since Bertrand competition is a more severe " punishment" than Coase pricing.
A limitation of the present analysis is that our Folk Theorem is only stated in terms of seller payoffs, and that we examine a model where only the uninformed party makes offers. We extend our results to buyer payoffs and to other extensive forms in a sequel (Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) D and (y,,+, P,(y, +)) D. By the monotonicity of P,(-), it follows that G(P,) c B,(P), demonstrating that p(P, P,) < E for all n > N1.
Since Rn --R uniformly, there also exists N2 such that for all n > N2, p(R, R,) < e. Using the fact that Iy -ql < 1, we conclude that p(J(q, ), J,(q, )) < 2e, for n > max{Nl, N2}. Consequently, the hypothesis of the theorem of the maximum is satisfied, so (2.1) holds for all q E [0,1].
It remains to be argued that (2.2) is also satisfied. Consider any q E[0,1] where t(-), P(-), and P(t(.)) are continuous. Observe that each of these functions is monotone: hence this restriction excludes at most countably many points. First, the theorem of the maximum implies that every cluster point of {t,(q)})=L is an element of T(q). Now T(-) is single-valued at q since t(-) is continuous: hence limn,,_ t,(q) = t(q). Second, observe from the definition of P(-) that P(-) is continuous at q if and only if (-.) is continuous at q. Let p be any accumulation point of { P(q)}=l1 and let rk T q and Sk i q be sequences of rationals. Then, for all k, Pn(rk) > P,(q) > Pn(k), and hence 4p(rk) >p > 4(sk). The continuity of 0(-) implies p is unique and p = limk -_.
(rk)-P(q), demonstrating that lim,n Pn(q) = P(q). Third, since t(.) and P(t(.)) are continuous at q, P(.) is continuous at t(q) and, hence, 4(.) is continuous at t(q). Let p' be any accumulation point of { P(t f(q))}= 1 and let rk' T t(q) and sk J t(q) be sequences of rationals. Observe that for every k > 0, there exists N(k) such that tn(q) E (rk, sk) for all n > N(k). Consequently, P.(r') > Pn(t.(q)) > Pn(s'), for all n > N(k), and 0(rk) > p'> 4(s)), for all k. As before, we can conclude lim n Pn(tn(q)) = P(t(q)).
Finally, by our construction of f,n(), f -f uniformly, and so lim_n fn(q) =f(q). Observe now
